9 files changed, 437 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/changelog b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/changelog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1ea4fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/changelog
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+fripost-postinst (0.0.0) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Tests
+
+ -- Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@fripost.org>  Wed, 17 Oct 2013 04:32:31 +0200
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/compat b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/compat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f8f011
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/compat
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+7
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/control b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/control
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e173159
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/control
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+Source: fripost-postinst
+Section: debian-installer
+Priority: optional
+Maintainer: Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@fripost.org>
+Build-Depends: debhelper (>= 7)
+
+Package: fripost-postinst
+XC-Package-Type: udeb
+Architecture: all
+Depends: fripost-partman, ${misc:Depends}
+Description: Post-install scripts (e.g., install dropbear in the initramfs)
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/copyright b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/copyright
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e26ce2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/copyright
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Format: http://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
+Source: native package
+
+Files: *
+Copyright: © 2013 Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@fripost.org>
+License: GPL-3+
+
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/install b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/install
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5426071
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/install
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+finish-install.d/*  /usr/lib/finish-install.d
+sshd_config         /var/lib/fripost
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/rules b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/rules
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..cbe925d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/rules
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#!/usr/bin/make -f
+%:
+	dh $@
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/templates b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/templates
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5385ce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/debian/templates
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+Template: base-installer/progress/fripost
+Type: text
+Description: ${WHAT}
+
+Template: fripost/initrd-ssh-port
+Type: string
+Default: 22
+Description: On which [address:]port should dropbear listen?
+Extended_description: If port is a range (e.g., 1024-65535), a random
+ port in that range is chosen.  Leaving the question empty is equivalent
+ to specifying the range of registered port 1024-49151.  This is only
+ used for remote (SSH) unlocking of encrypted disks.
+
+Template: fripost/dropbear-use-openssh-key
+Type: boolean
+Default: false
+Description: Use the same key for dropbear and OpenSSH?
+Extended_description: If False, generate a dedicated key for dropbear.
+
+Template: fripost/activate-selinux
+Type: boolean
+Default: true
+Description: Install and activate (in enforcing mode) SELinux?
+Extended_description: Note that activating SELinux requires a dummy
+ reboot to label all files.  So if you have full-disk encryption, you'll
+ have to send the password twice to dropbear.
+
+Template: fripost/keep-media-directory
+Type: boolean
+Default: false
+Description: Keep /media and its kids' entries in the fstab?
+Extended_description: /media (and its related entries in the fstab)
+ can safely be removed on a headless server.
+
+Template: fripost/sshd-fprs_title
+Type: text
+Description: Reboot in progress
+
+Template: fripost/sshd-fprs_text
+Type: note
+Description: Press 'continue' to reboot on the new system
+ We are done!  After rebooting you should be able to log in into your
+ new machine:
+ .
+     ssh ${USER}@${IPv4}
+ .
+ To defeat MiTM-attacks, please ensure (for instance by trying to log in
+ right now, although it won't be successful before the next reboot) that
+ the server's public key has the following fingerprint
+ .
+     ${SSHFPR_SERVER}
+ .
+ To unlock the encrypted disk, you need to send the key to the SSH
+ daemon living in in the initrd:
+ .
+     ssh -p ${PORT} -T root@${IPv4} < /path/to/key
+ .
+ An attacker successfully mounting a MiTM-attack could get hold of the
+ encryption key! It is crucial that you match this (single purpose)
+ server's fingerprint against
+ .
+     ${SSHFPR_INITRD}
+ .
+ Key(s) that are granted access to these two servers have the following
+ fingerprint:
+ .
+     ${SSHFPR_AUTHORIZED}
+
+Template: fripost/sshd-fprs-nodropbear_text
+Type: note
+Description: Press 'continue' to reboot on the new system
+ We are done! After rebooting you should be able to log in into your new
+ machine:
+ .
+     ssh ${USER}@${IPv4}
+ .
+ To defeat MiTM-attacks, please ensure (for instance by trying to log in
+ right now, although it won't be successful before the next reboot) that
+ the server's public key has the following fingerprint
+ .
+     ${SSHFPR_SERVER}
+ .
+ Key(s) that are granted access to the server have the following
+ fingerprint:
+ .
+     ${SSHFPR_AUTHORIZED}
+
+Template: fripost/final-notice
+Type: boolean
+Default: true
+Description: Display the final notice before rebooting?
+Extended_description: It's good to show SSH fingerprints, because it
+ defeats MiTM-attacks.
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/finish-install.d/07fripost b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/finish-install.d/07fripost
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..55d292b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/finish-install.d/07fripost
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+#
+# Fripost's postinstall scripts. Should be run after setting up the
+# users (06), and ideally before updating the initramfs (10).
+#
+# Copyright 2013 Guilhem Moulin <guilhem@fripost.org>
+#
+# Licensed under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher.
+
+# TODO: blacklist firewire-related modules, to defeat DMA-based attacks.
+
+set -ue
+
+. /lib/fripost-partman/base.sh
+import=/cdrom/include
+
+# Update the information below the progress bar. Also, log the argument.
+progress() {
+    log "$1"
+    db_subst base-installer/progress/fripost WHAT "$1"
+    db_progress INFO base-installer/progress/fripost
+}
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Ensure OpenSSH is installed, and generate a new key, longer than
+# default.
+
+progress "Installing packages"
+/bin/apt-install debconf initramfs-tools openssh-server
+sshHostKey=/target/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+rm -f "${sshHostKey}" "${sshHostKey}.pub"
+progress "Generating public/private rsa key pair (OpenSSH)"
+/bin/in-target /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -b 4096 -t rsa -N '' \
+    -C "${sshHostKey#/target}" -f "${sshHostKey#/target}"
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Put dropbear in the initrd if full disk encryption is desired.
+
+# Get username of the first user
+db_get passwd/username
+user="$RET"
+
+db_get fripost/encrypt
+encrypt=$RET
+if [ "$encrypt" = true ]; then
+    # Put dropbear in the initrd
+    progress "Installing dropbear"
+    /bin/apt-install dropbear
+
+    cat /var/lib/fripost/initrd-modules >> /target/etc/initramfs-tools/modules
+
+    rm -rf /target/etc/dropbear \
+           /target/etc/initramfs-tools/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key
+
+    # The default is not to copy the keys from the OpenSSH server to the
+    # initrd, because it's trivial for an attacker with physical access
+    # to the box to uncompress it and get hold of the private keys.
+
+    db_get fripost/dropbear-use-openssh-key
+    if [ "$RET" = true ]; then
+        progress "Converting OpenSSH rsa key to dropbear format"
+        /bin/in-target /usr/lib/dropbear/dropbearconvert openssh dropbear \
+            ${sshHostKey#/target} \
+            /etc/initramfs-tools/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key
+    else
+        progress "Generating public/private rsa key pair (dropbear)"
+        /bin/in-target /usr/bin/dropbearkey -t rsa -s 4096 \
+            -f /etc/initramfs-tools/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key
+    fi
+
+    progress "Copying authorized_keys to the initrd"
+    rm -rf /target/etc/initramfs-tools/root/.ssh
+    mkdir -pm0700 /target/etc/initramfs-tools/root/.ssh
+    copy_authorized_keys $import/authorized_keys /target/etc/initramfs-tools/root/.ssh/authorized_keys \
+                         'no-port-forwarding,no-agent-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-pty,command="/bin/cat >/lib/cryptsetup/passfifo"'
+
+    # Get the [address:]port to make dropbear listen to
+    db_get fripost/initrd-ssh-port
+    port="${RET:-1024-49151}"
+    min=${port%-*}
+    max=${port#*-}
+    if [ $port = "$min-$max" -a $min -le $max ]; then
+        # Pick a random port in the given range
+        port=$(/target/usr/bin/od -An -N2 -i /dev/urandom)
+        port=$(( $port % ($max + 1 - $min) + $min ))
+    fi
+    # See dropbear(8) for the list of options. Failure to read a keyfile
+    # makes dropbear disable the corresponding algorithm (including
+    # key-based authentication), in our case DSS/DSA.
+    log "Changing dropbear's options; port $port"
+    sed -i "s@^\s*/sbin/dropbear\$@& -d '' -sgjk -p $port@" \
+        /target/usr/share/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-premount/dropbear
+
+    # Sadly /usr/lib/finish-install.d/10update-initramfs only updates
+    # the ramdisk if both cryptsetup *and* console-setup are installed.
+    # (Cf. #694156 and #696773.) So we perform the update manually here.
+    progress "Generating new initramfs image"
+    /bin/in-target /usr/sbin/update-initramfs -u -t
+fi
+
+
+#######################################################################
+
+progress "Updating OpenSSH's server configuration"
+rm -f /target/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /target/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+cp /var/lib/fripost/sshd_config /target/etc/ssh/sshd_config
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Install and activate SELinux
+# TODO: would be better to have our own policy instead of amending the
+# default one.
+
+db_get fripost/activate-selinux
+if [ "$RET" = true ]; then
+    progress "Installing SELinux"
+    # Recommended packages include graphical tools...
+    /bin/in-target /usr/bin/debconf-apt-progress --no-progress -- \
+        apt-get -y install --no-install-recommends \
+            selinux-basics selinux-policy-default selinux-policy-dev auditd
+    progress "Activating SELinux"
+    /bin/in-target /usr/sbin/selinux-activate
+
+    sed -ri 's/^#?\s*(FSCKFIX)=(yes|no)\s*(\s#.*)?$/\1=yes/' \
+            /target/etc/default/rcS
+
+    progress "Running update-grub"
+    grep -q '^GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=' /target/etc/default/grub \
+        || fatal "Missing definition of 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX' in /etc/default/grub"
+    GRUB_CMDLINE="console=tty0 security=selinux enforcing=1"
+    # ^ TODO: we should leave (non SELinux-related) existing
+    # configuration options
+    sed -ri "s/^(GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX)=.*/\1=\"$GRUB_CMDLINE\"/" \
+            /target/etc/default/grub
+    /bin/in-target /usr/sbin/update-grub
+
+    if /bin/in-target /bin/sh -c "dpkg-query -s postfix >/dev/null 2>&1"; then
+        progress "Running postfix-nochroot"
+        echo 'SYNC_CHROOT=n' >> /target/etc/default/postfix
+        /bin/in-target /usr/sbin/postfix-nochroot
+    fi
+    # TODO: in a crontab: check-selinux-installation
+fi
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Remove unnecessary packages
+
+# TODO: check for dummy packages / RCs in a weekly crontab.
+dpkg_remove=$(mktemp -p /target/tmp)
+cat > "$dpkg_remove" <<- EOF
+	acpi
+	dictionaries-common
+	eject
+	ispell
+	laptop-detect
+	nano
+	tasksel
+	wamerican
+	wbritish
+EOF
+#XXX: the dummy package 'module-init-tools' is a dependency for 'acpid'.
+#/usr/sbin/chroot /target /usr/bin/dpkg-query \
+#        --show --showformat='${binary:Package} ${binary:Summary}\n' \
+#    | sed -rn 's/^(\S+)\s.*\btransitional dummy package\b.*/\1/p' \
+#    >> "$dpkg_remove"
+/bin/in-target /usr/bin/xargs -a"${dpkg_remove#/target}" \
+    debconf-apt-progress --no-progress -- apt-get -y autoremove --purge
+rm -f "$dpkg_remove"
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Remove /media and remove its related entries from the fstab.
+# It's a bit dirty to remove what we created earlier, but /media/cdrom
+# is required in the target, because apt gets some packages on that
+# pool.
+
+db_get fripost/keep-media-directory
+if [ "$RET" = false ]; then
+    log "Removing /media and amending the fstab"
+    sed -nr 's@^\S+\s+(/target/media/\S+)\s.*@\1@p' /proc/mounts \
+      | while read dir; do
+            log "Unmounting $dir"
+            /bin/umount "$dir"
+        done
+    sed -ri '/^[^#[:blank:]]+\s+\/media\//d' /target/etc/fstab
+
+    for mp in /target/media/*; do
+        if [ -h "$mp" ]; then
+            rm -f "$mp"
+        elif [ -d "$mp" ]; then
+            rmdir "$mp"
+        elif [ -e "$mp" ]; then
+            fatal "Could not remove $mp"
+        fi
+    done
+    rmdir /target/media
+fi
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Final notice before rebooting
+
+if [ "$encrypt" = false ]; then
+    # There is no dropbear
+    template=fripost/sshd-fprs-nodropbear_text
+else
+    template=fripost/sshd-fprs_text
+    db_subst "$template" PORT "$port"
+
+    # Convert the key to OpenSSH format, so we can use ssh-keygen
+    sshHostKey2=$(mktemp)
+    /usr/sbin/chroot /target /usr/bin/dropbearkey -y \
+        -f /etc/initramfs-tools/etc/dropbear/dropbear_rsa_host_key \
+        | grep -E '^(ssh-(dss|rsa)|ecdsa-sha2-nistp(256|384|521))' > "$sshHostKey2"
+    db_subst "$template" SSHFPR_INITRD "$(/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -lf $sshHostKey2)"
+    rm -f "$sshHostKey2"
+fi
+db_subst "$template" USER              "$user"
+db_subst "$template" IPv4              "$(getIPv4)"
+db_subst "$template" SSHFPR_SERVER     "$(/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -lf $sshHostKey)"
+db_subst "$template" SSHFPR_AUTHORIZED "$(sshfprs $import/authorized_keys '    - ')"
+
+db_get fripost/final-notice
+if [ "$RET" = true ]; then
+    # Start the SSH daemon to let the user's client to recognize the server
+    # hence make the weak TOFU model MiTM-immune.
+    progress "Starting OpenSSH"
+    /usr/sbin/chroot /target /usr/sbin/service ssh start
+
+    db_settitle fripost/sshd-fprs_title
+    db_input critical "$template"
+    db_go
+
+    # Don't show the usual "reboot in progress" notice
+    db_set finish-install/reboot_in_progress ''
+    db_fset finish-install/reboot_in_progress seen true
+
+    progress "Stopping OpenSSH"
+    /usr/sbin/chroot /target /usr/sbin/service ssh stop
+fi
+
+
+#######################################################################
+# Allow the user to log in via SSH at the next login.
+
+progress "Fixing permissions on home directories"
+db_get adduser/homedir-permission || true
+# Workaround for #398802
+if [ "${RET:-true}" = false ]; then
+    # Fix permissions for existing users
+    . /target/etc/adduser.conf
+    sed -rn "s@^([^:]+:){2}([0-9]+):([^:]*:){2}(/[^:]*):.*@\2 \4@p" /target/etc/passwd \
+    | while read uuid home; do
+        [ $uuid -ge $FIRST_UID -a $uuid -le $LAST_UID -a -d /target"$home" ] || continue
+        log "Fixing permissions on $home"
+        chmod 0700 /target"$home"
+    done
+
+    # Fix permissions for future users
+    sed -ri 's/^(DIR_MODE)=[0-9]+/\1=0700/' /target/etc/adduser.conf
+fi
+
+ugid="$(sed -rn "s@^$user:[^:]*:([0-9]+:[0-9]+):.*@\1@p" /target/etc/passwd)"
+home="$(sed -rn "s@^$user:([^:]*:){4}(/[^:]*):.*@\2@p"   /target/etc/passwd)"
+
+# Create ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and fix ownership. We create it *after*
+# stopping the SSH daemon to ensure that users can verify the
+# fingerprint but cannot log in.
+progress "Copying authorized_keys to ~$user/.ssh"
+[ -d /target"$home/.ssh" ] || mkdir -m0700 /target"$home/.ssh"
+copy_authorized_keys $import/authorized_keys /target"$home/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+chown -R "$ugid" /target"$home/.ssh" # Probably 1000:1000, but who knows
diff --git a/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/sshd_config b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/sshd_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e81b272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/fripost-postinst-udeb/sshd_config
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# What ports, IPs and protocols we listen for
+Port 22
+# Use these options to restrict which interfaces/protocols sshd will bind to
+#ListenAddress ::
+#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+Protocol 2
+# HostKeys for protocol version 2
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+#Privilege Separation is turned on for security
+UsePrivilegeSeparation yes
+
+# Logging
+SyslogFacility AUTH
+LogLevel INFO
+
+# Authentication:
+LoginGraceTime 120
+PermitRootLogin no
+AllowGroups ssh
+StrictModes yes
+
+PubkeyAuthentication yes
+#AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys
+
+# Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with
+# some PAM modules and threads)
+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+
+# Change to no to disable tunnelled clear text passwords
+PasswordAuthentication no
+
+X11Forwarding no
+PrintMotd no
+PrintLastLog yes
+TCPKeepAlive yes
+
+# Allow client to pass locale environment variables
+AcceptEnv LANG LC_*
+
+Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server