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See RFC 8314 sec. 3.3 "Cleartext Considered Obsolete".
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We don't need it anymore as we use https:// these days.
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We're going through IPsec to communicate with the IMAP server.
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More precisely, between our NTP-master (stratum 1) host and the other
machines (all stratum 2). Providing authentification and integrity for
internal NTP traffic ensures a consistent time within our internal
infrastructure.
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We use a dedicated, non-routable, IPv4 subnet for IPSec. Furthermore
the subnet is nullrouted in the absence of xfrm lookup (i.e., when there
is no matching IPSec Security Association) to avoid data leaks.
Each host is associated with an IP in that subnet (thus only reachble
within that subnet, either by the host itself or by its IPSec peers).
The peers authenticate each other using RSA public key authentication.
Kernel traps are used to ensure that connections are only established
when traffic is detected between the peers; after 30m of inactivity
(this value needs to be less than the rekeying period) the connection is
brought down and a kernel trap is installed.
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Interhost communications are protected by stunnel4. The graphs are only
visible on the master itself, and content is generated by Fast CGI.
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Using client-side data signing/encryption and wrapping inter-host
communication into stunnel.
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We've yet to get authenticated time, though.
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We can therefore spare some lookups on the MDA, and use static:all
instead.
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The clients are identified using their certificate, and connect securely
to the SyncProv.
There are a few workarounds (XXX) in the ACLs due to Postfix not
supporting SASL binds in Wheezy.
Overview:
- Authentication (XXX: strong authentication) is required prior to any DIT
operation (see 'olcRequires').
- We force a Security Strength Factor of 128 or above for all operations (see
'olcSecurity'), meaning one must use either a local connection (eg,
ldapi://, possible since we set the 'olcLocalSSF' to 128), or TLS with at
least 128 bits of security.
- XXX: Services may not simple bind other than locally on a ldapi:// socket.
If no remote access is needed, they should use SASL/EXTERNAL on a ldapi://
socket whenever possible (if the service itself supports SASL binds).
If remote access is needed, they should use SASL/EXTERNAL on a ldaps://
socket, and their identity should be derived from the CN of the client
certificate only (hence services may not simple bind).
- Admins have restrictions similar to that of the services.
- User access is only restricted by our global 'olcSecurity' attribute.
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For some reason giraff doesn't like IPSec. App-level TLS sessions are
less efficient, but thanks to ansible it still scales well.
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Also, add the 'managesieve' RoundCube plugin to communicate with our
server.
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We use a "master" NTP server, which synchronizes against stratum 1
servers (hence is a stratum 2 itself); all other clients synchronize to
this master server through IPSec.
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(For now, only LMTP and IMAP processes, without replication.)
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