| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files |
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There is no need to bother with X.509 cruft here.
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We use a dedicated, non-routable, IPv4 subnet for IPSec. Furthermore
the subnet is nullrouted in the absence of xfrm lookup (i.e., when there
is no matching IPSec Security Association) to avoid data leaks.
Each host is associated with an IP in that subnet (thus only reachble
within that subnet, either by the host itself or by its IPSec peers).
The peers authenticate each other using RSA public key authentication.
Kernel traps are used to ensure that connections are only established
when traffic is detected between the peers; after 30m of inactivity
(this value needs to be less than the rekeying period) the connection is
brought down and a kernel trap is installed.
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For some reason giraff doesn't like IPSec. App-level TLS sessions are
less efficient, but thanks to ansible it still scales well.
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Instead, generate a server certificate for each host (on the machine
itself). Then fetch all these certs locally, and copy them over to each
IPSec peer. That requires more certs to be stored on each machines (n
vs 2), but it can be done automatically, and is easier to deploy.
Note: When adding a new machine to the inventory, one needs to run the
playbook on that machine (to generate the cert and fetch it locally)
first, then on all other machines.
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We use a dedicated instance for each role: MDA, MTA out, MX, etc.
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This is pointless since the service will be restarted anyway.
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In particular, run 'apt-get update' right after configured APT, and
restart daemon right after configured them.
The advantage being that if ansible crashes in some "task", the earlier
would already be restarted if neeeded. (This may not happen in the next
run since the configuration should already be up to date.)
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Packets originating from our (non-routable) $ipsec are marked; there is
no xfrm lookup (i.e., no matching IPSec association), the packet will
retain its mark and be null routed later on, thanks to
ip rule add fwmark "$secmark" table 666 priority 666
ip route add blackhole default table 666
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At the each IPSec end-point the traffic is DNAT'ed to / MASQUERADE'd
from our dedicated IP after ESP decapsulation. Also, some IP tables
ensure that alien (not coming from / going to the tunnel end-point) is
dropped.
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