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In order to avoid ‘double-bounce@’ ending up on spammer mailing lists.
See http://www.postfix.org/ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_README.html .
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Following Viktor Dukhovni's 2015-08-06 recommendation
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.mail.postfix.user/251935
(We're using stronger ciphers and protocols in our own infrastructure.)
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Following Viktor Dukhovni's 2015-08-06 recommendation for Postfix >= 2.11
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.mail.postfix.user/251935
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Ideally we we should also increase the Diffie-Hellman group size from
2048-bit to 3072-bit, as per ENISA 2014 report.
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/algorithms-key-size-and-parameters-report-2014
But we postpone that for now until we are reasonably certain that older
client won't be left out.
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That is, on the MSA and in our local infrastructure.
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Put all relay restrictions under smtpd_relay_restrictions and leave
smtpd_recipient_restrictions empty, since we don't do DNSBL.
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We don't want to bounce messages for which the recipient(s)' MTA replies
451 due to some greylisting in place. We would like to accept 451
alone, but unfortunately it's not possible to bounce unverified
recipients due to DNS or networking errors.
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This is specially useful for mailing lists and the webmail, since it
prevents our outgoing gateway from accepting mails known to be bouncing.
However the downside is that it adds a delay of up to 6s after the
RCPT TO command.
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On the MDA the domain is our 'mda.fripost.org', there is no need to
perform an extra DNS lookup.
The MSA does not perform local or virtual delivery, but relays
everything to the outgoing SMTP proxy.
On the MX, there is no need to check for recipient validity as we are
the final destination; but unsure that the RCPT TO address is a valid
recipient before doing the greylisting.
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For some reason giraff doesn't like IPSec. App-level TLS sessions are
less efficient, but thanks to ansible it still scales well.
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E.g., ldap.fripost.org, ntp.fripost.org, etc. (Ideally the DNS zone
would be provisioned by ansible, too.) It's a bit unclear how to index
the subdomains (mx{1,2,3}, etc), though.
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