Postfix: pin key material to our MX:es for fripost.org and its subdomains.

This solves an issue where an attacker would strip the STARTTLS keyword
from the EHLO response, thereby preventing connection upgrade; or spoof
DNS responses to route outgoing messages to an attacker-controlled
SMTPd, thereby allowing message MiTM'ing.  With key material pinning in
place, smtp(8postfix) immediately aborts the connection (before the MAIL
command) and places the message into the deferred queue instead:

    postfix-out/smtp[NNN]: … dsn=4.7.5, status=undeliverable (Server certificate not verified)

This applies to the smarthost as well as for verification probes on the
Mail Submission Agent.  Placing message into the deferred queue might
yield denial of service, but we argue that it's better than a privacy
leak.

This only covers *internal messages* (from Fripost to Fripost) though:
only messages with ‘fripost.org’ (or a subdomain of such) as recipient
domain.  Other domains, even those using mx[12].fripost.org as MX, are
not covered.  A scalable solution for arbitrary domains would involve
either DANE and TLSA records, or MTA-STS [RFC8461].  Regardless, there
is some merit in hardcoding our internal policy (when the client and
server are both under our control) in the configuration.  It for
instance enables us to harden TLS ciphers and protocols, and makes the
verification logic independent of DNS.

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/roles/out/templates/etc/postfix/main.cf.j2 b/roles/out/templates/etc/postfix/main.cf.j2
index c05d9a5..f8aa55a 100644
--- a/roles/out/templates/etc/postfix/main.cf.j2
+++ b/roles/out/templates/etc/postfix/main.cf.j2
@@ -39,41 +39,44 @@ local_recipient_maps =
 message_size_limit  = 0
 recipient_delimiter = +
 
 relay_domains       =
 relay_transport     = error:5.3.2 Relay Transport unavailable
 
 # Replace internal system addresses under $myhostname with a valid address
 canonical_maps    = lmdb:$config_directory/canonical
 canonical_classes = envelope_sender, envelope_recipient
 
 # All header rewriting happens upstream
 local_header_rewrite_clients =
 
 
 smtp_tls_security_level         = may
 smtp_tls_ciphers                = medium
 smtp_tls_protocols              = !SSLv2, !SSLv3
 smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer    = yes
 smtp_tls_session_cache_database = lmdb:$data_directory/smtp_tls_session_cache
 
-smtpd_tls_security_level        = none
+smtp_tls_fingerprint_digest = sha256
+smtp_tls_policy_maps        = lmdb:$config_directory/smtp_tls_policy
+
+smtpd_tls_security_level = none
 
 strict_rfc821_envelopes = yes
 smtpd_delay_reject      = yes
 disable_vrfy_command    = yes
 
 smtpd_client_restrictions =
     permit_mynetworks
     # We are the only ones using this proxy, but if things go wrong we
     # want to know why
     defer
 
 smtpd_helo_required     = yes
 smtpd_helo_restrictions =
     reject_invalid_helo_hostname
 
 smtpd_sender_restrictions =
     reject_non_fqdn_sender
 
 smtpd_relay_restrictions =
     reject_non_fqdn_recipient